

Summary. Several pathological symptoms caused by deficiencies of minor elements have been observed in this province. Boron deficiency causes water core of turnips and crown rot of beets on the Nilgiris. Mottling of orange leaves due to deficiency of zinc is prevalent in many districts. 'Exanthema' of citrus is caused by copper deficiency. Methods of supplying these deficiencies are described.

Recently a decline of oranges in Kotagiri, Yercaud and other hilly districts has been attributed to deficiencies of several elements including zinc, manganese and boron. This was revealed by spectrographic analysis of plant tissues with a view to obtain a correct estimate of the nutritional status of the plants is stressed.

Gleanings

The peasant and the commissar. An analysis of Russian agricultural policy: For 82 years Russia has been attempting to convert agriculture into an industry on the same lines as the heavy industries. In the plan, control of all farm production was to be centered in Moscow. Workers were to be regimented in the same way as factory hands and miners. The experiment has not succeeded even to the small extent achieved in other industries. According to the "Soviet Encyclopaedia", Lenin, in 1913, wanted to encourage the small farmers to join co-operatives, i.e. groups in farmers help each other by lending implements, machinery and (sometimes) workers. Most small farmers had no objection to this scheme; it helped them by opening up marketing co-operatives as well. Afterwards, if the plan worked, they were to be plunged into collectivisation (i.e. communisation in which the State owns all implements, equipment and cattle). This was known as "Lenin's Co-operative Plan". Its ultimate object, however, was not "co-operation" as such, but the complete submerging of agriculture into the Soviet economic plan. Large landowners had been liquidated, the Kulaks (independent farm owners) were necessary for the time, because of their experience. Peasants, who formed the major part of the producing farmers, had to be encouraged.

Stalin impatient: Stalin, on the other hand, was more impatient. In an essay "Problems of Leninism" written in 1926 he discussed an alliance between the labouring masses and the peasantry, and wrote: "This special form of alliance consists in that the guiding force of this alliance is the proletariat. This special form of alliance consists in that the leader of the State, the leader in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat, is one party the party of the Communists, which does not and cannot share that leadership with other parties. In fact, the alliance is of the nature of the relationship between officer and man". The Russian peasantry of 1926 was, therefore, in the position of having been manoeuvred into bringing in the new "officers" to replace the old landlords. The main difference was that the "officers" were controlled by the central Party in Moscow. The fifteenth Party Congress in December 1927 adopted a resolution for "positive measures to be taken to collectivise peasant farming". These measures included the abolition of the Kulaks and controlling of agriculture by thousands of bureaucrats drawn from the proletariat. By November 1929, more than 25,000 city workers had been sent to the country to organise farms on Stalinist lines. Their duties were political but they became virtually "bosses of the peasantry".

In December of that year Stalin delivered a speech at the "Conference of Marxist Students". In it he said: We have passed on to a policy of eliminating the Kulaks as a class. In this way the independent farmer was to follow the large landowner into "liquidation". The decree to put this into effect was published in January 1930. It provided for the expulsion of the Kulaks from their territories and the confiscation of their houses, cattle and machinery. In that winter alone, 500,000 Kulaks were exiled—many of them to far Eastern Siberia where they worked as slave-labourers in the mines or in the lumber camps. During the following two years, that is, until 1932, a total of 2,000,000 Kulaks and better class peasants, followed the same route to the death camps.

In this way agriculture was denuded of its most efficient members. The remainder were inefficient and, therefore, prepared to fit in with the government scheme of full collectivisation. Controlled by the bureaucrats, they failed to produce sufficient food for the winter 1932-33. A famine which was most severe in the Ukraine and in Southern Russia, was the direct result.

"Capitalistic" concessions: The Kremlin, realising this, was forced to make some major concessions. In the towns, free markets for farm produce were re-introduced. Collective farms as a whole, and individual farmers, were allowed to market any grain left over after they had handed over their state quota. The delivery of quotas was amended. The Kremlin had, therefore, been forced to retreat a little towards a state of "capitalism" in production and trade. It had, in fact, admitted the failure of the attempt to impose the Stalinist policy on farming. That was in 1935; but the position is the same today. The peasantry, although collectivised to a considerable extent, is still far behind the heavy and other industries in "communisation". The farmers, however, still operate under bureaucracy with control centralized in Moscow.

The inefficiency of the bureaucrats and the apathy of the farm workers have prevented any real progress. In fact, comparing the small improvement in output with that achieved by modern methods in other countries the Soviet's 30 years of experiments can be considered a failure. In Great Britain the agricultural output for 1948 is three times that of 1938.

In some parts of the Soviet Union, noticeably in the Ukraine, there are collective farms which have been a success. These form a "shop window". Well cultivated land, comfortable houses, tractors and other agricultural machinery, and well-fed farmers do useful service in impressing foreign visitors; the latter are never allowed to get a glimpse of farms that would give a true picture of the general state of Soviet agriculture.

The same propaganda methods are used in other industries and undertakings. In the Dalstroy area in far Eastern Siberia, for instance, the capital, Magadan, is merely a facade behind which nearly a million slave labourers die a slow death. In the "corrective-labour" camps near Moscow the "educational facilities" are demonstrated. These, too, hide the brutality and inhumanity of the M. V. D. (secret police) system. The collective farms in the Ukraine and Southern Russia are mementoes of the 2,000,000 liquidated Kulaks and peasants. Like Stalin's statement in January 1933 they are the beautiful lies behind which the bureaucrat-ridden peasants plod their weary way (British Information Services).

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